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The purpose of the present investigation was to; (a) investigate 
the general effect of a hypothetical wife-battering case on simulated 
jurors* perceptions of a defendant's guilt, (b) assess the impact of 
manipulating two informational variables in the case, victim provo­
cation and intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors* verdicts, and 
(c) examine the relationship between jurors* perceptions of guilt and 
general views of the role of women in society, as estimated by a 
short version of the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS).
174 subjects who had previously completed the AWS were selected 
from University of Montana psychology classes and randomly assigned 
to one,of four experimental conditions. All subjects received a 
case summary involving charges stemming from an incident in which a 
woman was beaten by her husband. Half of the subjects received 
information which indicated the victim had provoked the beating, 
while the other subjects received information which indicated she had 
not. Likewise, case summaries either indicated that the defendant 
was intoxicated at the time of the battering incident, or that he was 
sober. Subjects first read the case summaries, then rendered an 
individual verdict and made recommendations for sentencing. Next, 
subjects were divided into six-person jury groups and asked to ren­
der an unanimous group verdict. Finally, subjects completed a brief 
questionnaire concerning their perceptions of the victim, the defen­
dant, and the case in general.
Results indicated that: (a) when the victim had provoked the batter­
ing, female subjects were significantly more likely to find the defen­
dant guilty than when the victim did nothing to provoke her attacker, 
(b) jurors who were told the defendant was intoxicated were no more 
likely to find the defendant innocent than were those jurors who were 
told he was sober, and (c) jurors having traditional attitudes toward 
the role of women were no more likely to find the defendant not guilty 
when his wife provoked the incident than those jurors having more non- 
traditional attitudes toward the role of women in society.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the problem of violence within the family, particularly 
marital violence, has become a topic of national Interest, with the 
appearance of television programs, newspaper and magazine articles, 
books, and professional journal articles bespeaking a public awareness 
which was nonexistent ten years ago. As a result, more and more women 
who are the victims of marital violence are realizing that this abuse 
does not necessarily have to be tolerated and are now bringing assault 
charges against their spouses. Thus, the prosecution of cases Involv­
ing "wlfe-batterlng" Is becoming a much more frequent occurrence (Martin, 
1976).
However, despite rising public Interest In the plight of the 
battered woman, researchers are finding that the majority of people 
still hold a number of myths about wife-battering to be true, and that 
many Individuals condone the use of physical force within a marital 
relationship (Celles, 1972; Stark & McEvoy, 1970). When one considers, 
then, that It Is with just such people that the ultimate decision of 
guilt rests for court cases Involving marital violence, this poses some 
Important questions. For Instance, how will the belief that female 
battering victims "ask for It", I.e., the myth of provocation, ( Martin, 
1976) affect jurors' perceptions of a defendant's guilt? Likewise, 
how will the tendency of many people to view drunkenness as a justifi­
cation for the assaulter's loss of control In a battering situation 
(Celles, 1972) Influence jurors' decisions? And more generally, what
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Impact will the tendency to devalue women who are victims of violence 
(Lemer & Simmons, 1966; Symonds, 1975) have on jurors* perceptions of 
conjugal assault cases?
The majority of the research dealing directly with perceptions of 
marital violence has been conducted using interview and case history 
procedures (Gayford, 1975; Celles» 1972; Stark & McEvoy, 1970), How­
ever, numerous studies have appeared in the social psychological lit­
erature which can be considered to be related to attitudes concerning 
marital violence. Many of these studies have utilized a basic paradigm 
originally designed by Buss (1963) which involves having subjects 
either shock victims or view victims being shocked. This analogue 
work has contributed a great deal to what is known about situational 
determinants of aggressive behavior, including the sex of the aggressor, 
as well as the sex and characteristics of the victim (for review, see 
Frodi, Macaulay & Thome, 1977). Similarly, another area of social 
psychological research, that of attribution, has produced a variety 
of studies which have examined attitudes toward victims of a multitude 
of different crimes, accidents, and circumstances (e.g., Jones &
Aronson, 1973; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Lemer & Simmons, 1966). Finally, 
mock jury research has investigated the effects of a variety of situa­
tional variables on jurors* perceptions of a defendant*s guilt in cases 
involving the perpetration of violence on a victim (for review, see 
Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977).
However, none of these social psychological studies concerning 
attitudes toward aggression and attitudes toward victims appears to 
have dealt specifically with the assessment of attitudes toward aggres­
sion or violence within a marital relationship. Likewise, mock jury
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research has not Investigated the effects of situational variables on 
perceived guilt of a defendant when his victim is specifically related 
to him by marriage. Clearly, the findings of Celles and others suggest 
that the added element of the existence of a marital relationship 
between an aggressor and his victim could significantly alter percep­
tions and attitudes toward the aggressive behavior.
The basic purpose of the current investigation, then, was three­
fold. First, it attempted to investigate the general effect a hypo­
thetical wife-battering case would have on simulated jurors' percep­
tions of a defendant's guilt. Second, it also attempted to assess 
the impact of manipulating two situational variables in the case, 
namely victim provocation and intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors' 
verdicts. Finally, the relationship between perception of guilt and 
general views of the role of women in society, as assessed by a short 
version of the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS) (Spence, Helmreich & 
Stapp, 1973), was examined.
The following literature review is organized into two parts.
First, research which has dealt directly with attitudes and perceptions 
of marital violence via case history and interview methods will be 
discussed. Cultural beliefs and stereotypes concerning wife-battering 
will be presented at this time. Next, investigations of a primarily 
social psychological nature, which appear to be related to the general 
area of attitudes toward violence and victims will be examined. Included 
will be those studies which have been concerned with aggressive 
behavior in a laboratory setting, victim devaluation or derogation, 
and simulated jurors' decisions in cases involving violence and a victim.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Cultural Perceptions of Marital Violence
Because of the Increase in professional and public attention 
being directed towards the phenomenon of marital violence, it would 
almost appear that wife-battering is a new social problem, the fre­
quency of which has mushroomed in recent years. However, statistical 
evidence indicates that wife-battering is neither new nor is it dras­
tically increasing (Martin, 1976), A more plausible explanation of 
this apparent sudden rise in the phenomenon is that, prior to the 
1970’s, marital violence, like child abuse, appears to have been a 
taboo subject which was virtually ignored by both the public and social 
scientists alike (Celles, 1972; Straus, 1976).
Celles (1972) traces this "selective inattention" to a number of 
factors. One of these seems to be the societal definition of the 
family as nonviolent. The American family is ideally thought by many 
to be that entity typified by television's situation-comedies: a 
warm, supportive, and peaceful refuge from the harshness of the world 
outside. In fact, states Celles, this happy picture of family life in 
America is somewhat of a myth, as he concluded that in many case "a 
marriage license also functions as a hitting license" (p. 153). How­
ever, the mistaken belief that husband-wife violence is a relatively 
rare type of behavior has led sociologists and psychologists to ignore
5
the actual violence occurring frequently in "normal" families. Thus, 
as Steinmetz and Straus (1974) have suggested, the "semisacred" nature 
of the family in society seems, in part, to account for the paucity of 
research in the area of family violence. This, however, has been chang­
ing in recent years.
Likewise, viewing marital violence as a rare form of individual 
psychopathology has allowed the public to perceive wife-battering as 
something which only a very few "sick" individuals do. Numerous authors 
(e.g.. Celles, 1976; Gil, 1970; Walker, Note 1) have postulated that 
the myth of the wife-beater as "sick" has persisted in the face of 
evidence to the contrary because it allows people to think of wife- 
battering as something only a "psychopath" does; they then do not have 
to wonder if they themselves are abusers. By definition they cannot be, 
because they are not "sick".
Similarly, the popular assumption that marital violence is more 
likely to occur in ghetto and lower-class families (Martin, 1976) also 
reflects the unwillingness of most individuals to face the univer­
sality of the problem, again, despite evidence to the contrary. Bard
(1971), for example, has found that the number of cases involving wife 
abuse reported in New York's West Harlem, a community of working-class 
Blacks and Chicanos, was approximately the same as that reported during 
the same period in Norwalk, Connecticut, a white, upper-middle-class 
community with the same size population.
However, there are some societal expectations with respect to 
violence in the family which appear to conflict with this ideal that 
violence does not occur in "normal" families. On the one hand, the
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family is characterized as gentle, peaceful and harmonious, while on 
the other hand, there are some societal norms which legitimize, and 
even encourage, the use of physical force within the family— as in the 
disciplining and training of children. The old maxim "spare the rod 
and spoil the child", suggests Celles (1976), is indicative of cultural 
norms concerning force and physical violence toward children. In the 
case of husband-wife violence. Stark and McEvoy (1970), in their 
analysis of data provided by the National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence, found that nearly one-fourth of all Americans 
polled admitted to approving of hitting one's spouse on certain, 
appropriate occasions. Pamas (1967), in his work as a police officer 
intervening in domestic disputes, discovered that there were some 
occasions when wives felt that it was acceptable for a husband to 
beat his wife. In short, some violence in marital and family interac­
tions is considered by some to be normal, routine, and even necessary. 
According to Celles (1972), from the point of view of the offender, 
normal violence is "normal" because it is used to achieve some positive 
goal. Likewise, the victim also believes that the physical force used 
was necessary and acceptable, because he or she either benefitted from 
it or deserved it.
It should be clear at this point that although in the past 
society has, to a certain extent, denied the existence of marital and 
family violence in a fairly large proportion of the population, there 
are still cultural norms which appear to legitimize violent behavior in 
the family, if not normalize it. Several assumptions and stereotypes 
concerning wife-battering appear to have been instrumental in this
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legitimization. One of these Involves the rather basic assumption 
that. In certain situations. It may be beneficial for one Individual 
to hit or slap another. Another stereotype which appears to have 
played a part In Justifying spouse abuse Is the picture of a nagging, 
shrewish wife who "asks for It" by verbally abusing her long-suffer­
ing husband until he assaults her. Finally, the tendency on the part 
of many people to view Intoxication as a justification for loss of con­
trol, has also played a part In excusing the behavior of an Individual 
who harms his wife while In an Intoxicated state (e.g., '̂He was drunk—  
he didn't know what he was doing"). A more detailed discussion of 
each of these points of view follows.
As has been discussed previously, the family Is one of the very 
few groups to which society gives a clear right (and sometimes the 
obligation) to use physical force and restraint, as, for example. In 
the physical punishment of children (Celles, 1976). Similarly, several 
authors have encountered the belief that It may be necessary for a 
husband to use violent means, under certain circumstances, with his 
wife.
Celles (1972), In his Interviews with over 80 families, discovered 
that the belief that husband-wife violence Is acceptable If It achieves 
some goal Is not uncommon. In such circumstances, the husband Is 
typically the aggressor and the wife the victim, although Celles has 
encountered cases Involving wifely aggression toward the husband. In 
some cases, wives believe that they are struck because they deserve It. 
Celles quotes one wife as saying, "I have a habit of not keeping my 
mouth shut. I keep at him and at him, so he finally turns around and
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belts me. It's usually my fault, I ask for It" (p. 59). Celles has 
also encountered the rather surprising viewpoint that the act of hit­
ting often relieves tension and thus prevents the buildup of further 
pressure which might result in a more serious assault. This seems to 
clarify somewhat why the wives whom Parnas (1967) interviewed felt 
that an occasional beating was not necessarily negative.
Another variety of conjugal violence which is often justified 
on the basis that it is beneficial, is that of the husband using 
violence to bring his wife "to her senses" (Celles, 1972, p* 61). 
Circumstances frequently cited as being appropriate for this type 
of violence include an hysterical spouse or an extremely angry one. 
Adrian and Mitchell (1978), in their interviews with battered women, 
were informed by one woman that she felt that it was entirely 
appropriate for her husband to slap her "if she were ever to get out 
of hand" (p. 19), meaning whenever she was uncontrollable or deserved 
it. This belief that in certain situations, it is beneficial to hit 
or slap another individual may be encountered as well in other than 
husband-wife relationships, but it would seem that the application 
of such an assumption might particularly lend itself to legitimizing 
the occurrence of marital violence under certain circumstances.
The persistent stereotype of the battered wife as a nagging, 
shrewish individual who provokes her attacker, has also contributed 
to the legitimization of wife abiise. Celles (1972) comments that this 
image has been fostered, in part by stand-up comedians and television 
comedies— for example, Ralph Cramden on the old "Honeyrooners" show 
threatens "one of these days...pow, right in the kisser" (p. 138).
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Likewise, certain works of literature, for example Shakespeare's 
"Taming of the Shrew", also seem to have contributed to this Image. 
Until recently, mental health professionals have also done their 
share In perpetuating the stereotype of the wife who "asks for It". 
Snell, Rosenwald, & Robey (1964), In their article concerning person­
ality characteristics of the wife of the wlfebeater, variously describe 
such women as castrating, controlling, masochistic, frigid, and unfeml- 
nlne. Similarly, Goode (1974) argues that marital violence Is typi­
cally the product of a "war of words so sharp, with the feeling of 
betrayal and loss so great, that redress must be physical and destruc­
tive" (p. 38). He lays the blame for such a "war" on the woman, as 
he feels that she Is the one who typically Is the "most competent In 
verbal attack" (p. 38). It Is understandable, then, that the picture 
of a man who has been pushed to the limits of his endurance by a taunt­
ing wife comes so easily to mind when one hears of wlfe-batterlng.
This Is not to say, as Celles (1972) points out, that there Is 
not some grain of truth In this Image. Wives who have been assaulted 
by their spouses often believe that they provoked the attack by nag­
ging or being verbally abusive. Many battered wives state that If 
they could have kept silent, the violence never would have occurred. 
However, Celles concludes that It Is a fallacy to think that the 
wife Is totally to blame. He reports frequently encountering women 
whose apparent nagging had a reason behind It. One woman was hit In 
the face by her husband when she asked him to help her shovel snow; 
another said that she had been beaten severely after asking her spouse 
for grocery money. Walker (Note 1) has also concluded that It Is not
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uncommon for battering incidents to have "no ground in reason" (p. 6), 
having counseled women who were awakened from a deep sleep to be 
assaulted by their spouses. Whatever the circumstances, the major 
point to be made here is that, legally, nagging or verbal provocation 
is not sufficient justification for hitting or beating another person.
However, the myth of victim-precipitated marital violence hangs 
on, with attitudes toward abused women bearing a striking resemblance 
to attitudes toward rape victims (Pogrebin, 1974). It is not uncommon, 
states Sands (1976), to find those who believe that the battered 
woman finds a certain masochistic pleasure in being beaten, just as 
some believe the rape victim enjoys violent sex. Not surprisingly, 
these beliefs are often internalized by the victim, such that battered 
women will frequently accept total responsibility for the violence 
(Adrian & Mitchell, 1978). Underlying this acceptance, states Celles
(1972), is the assumption by many that anyone can be justifiably provoked 
verbally to physical violence, and that verbal abuse is sufficient 
justification for hitting another individual. Implicit, it would also 
seem, in this acceptance, is the assumption that one is not as respon­
sible for violent actions which have been provoked by intolerable ver­
bal abuse.
Finally, the frequent involvement of alcohol in marital violence 
has been cited by numerous authors as a means of "disavowing the 
deviance" of wife-battering (e.g., Bard & Zacker, 1971; §nell, Rosen­
wald, & Robey, 1964). Celles (1972) found a high association between 
violence and alcohol, as did Wolfgang (1957). One important aspect of 
Celles' findings was that alcohol-related violence was almost exclusively
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male violence. In only one family out of the 80 Interviewed, did a 
wife become violent towards her husband while drinking. In most cases. 
Celles found that the wives In these families placed the blame for 
their husbands' violence on alcohol; I.e., they believed alcohol had 
caused their husbands to act violently and excused somewhat their 
behavior. Bard and Zacker (1974) have also noted that there Is a per­
sistent tendency on the part of most people to Infer a causal rela­
tionship between alcohol and violence.
Lang and his colleagues have postulated that the drinklng-aggresslon 
relationship Is mediated by certain expectancies concerning the 
effects of alcohol consumption and by a tendency of many people to 
attribute antl-soclal acts to their Intoxicated state (Lang, Goeckner, 
Adesso & Marlatt, 1975). Along these same lines, Sobell and Sobell
(1973) have pointed out that one of the rewards of heavy drinking Is 
that It provides a socially acceptable excuse for engaging In other­
wise unacceptable behaviors. Including violence, with a minimum of 
social disapproval.
Celles (1972) feels that drunkenness serves two Important functions 
In marital or family violence. First, drinking can act as a means of 
neutralizing or "disavowing the deviance" (p. 114) of hitting a family 
member. Thus, the assaulter will often explain that he was Intoxi­
cated at the time the Incident occurred and was not totally respon­
sible for his behavior. The family and others will then agree that 
alcohol caused the Individual to lose control of his behavior. There­
fore, whatever has happened Is not really the assaulter's fault.
Second, because of the common assumption that alcohol may cause Inappro­
priate behavior, the drinker can utilize the period when he Is drunk
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as a "time out" (p. 116) from the norms of everyday life. According 
to Celles, the Individual, once sober, can then deny knowledge of the 
violent behavior ("I don't remember, I was drunk"), apologize ("I didn't 
know what I was doing"), or excuse the behavior ("I never would have 
done It If I had been sober"), and stand a good chance of having his 
denial, apology, or excuses accepted by both his wife and others.
Thus, attests Martin (1976), by pleading Intoxication, the assaulter, 
his victim, and others can admit that violence has occurred, but also 
maintain that alcohol was responsible for that violence. Apparently,
In our society, notes Martin, violent actions become more understandable 
and excusable when they happen to be performed by someone who Is Intox­
icated. There Is even some rather controversial legal support for 
this view. In the form of the "diminished capacity doctrine". This 
doctrine reduces the degree of homicide to second degree murder or 
voluntary manslaughter when the offender Is proved to have been Intox­
icated (Kiser, 1944). However, according to Adrian and Mitchell (1978),
In the case of aggravated or misdemeanor assault, being voluntarily Intox­
icated or drugged Is not a sufficient legal defense. In short. It can 
be seen that the tendency of many to view drunkenness as a justifica­
tion for loss of control In a battering situation also plays an Impor­
tant part In normalizing somewhat the phenomenon of wife abuse.
In summary. It can be seen that some common stereotypes or assump­
tions concerning wlfe-batterlng, particularly the myth of provocation 
and the view of Intoxication as a justification for loss of control, 
have been Instrumental In legitimizing this type of violence. Clearly, 
as was noted at the outset, the existence of these cultural beliefs
13
raises some important questions concerning the effects these beliefs 
or stereotypes may have on jurors* perceptions of wife-battering 
cases.
Aggressive Behavior and Attitudes toward Victims: Experimental Evidence
The following portion of this literature review will survey those 
experimental investigations which have appeared primarily in the social 
psychological literature and seem to be related to the perception of 
marital violence. Examination of these studies will be organized 
into three parts. First, research which has dealt with aggressive 
behavior, via analogue techniques, will be discussed. Next, litera­
ture concerning victim derogation and the attribution of responsibil­
ity for various crimes, incidents and circumstances will be covered. 
Last, simulated jury research which has examined jurors' perceptions 
of guilt in cases involving violence and victims will be reviewed.
Also, since a simulated jury will be utilized in the present investi­
gation, the methodology of simulated jury studies will be critiqued.
Attitudes toward Aggression
Although this portion of the literature has been entitled 
"Attitudes toward Aggression", it should be noted that the majority 
of the studies to be examined here actually utilized paradigms which 
investigated the willingness of subjects to be overtly aggressive 
(physically or verbally) in a variety of situations. However, for 
the purposes of this review, these studies on aggression have been 
included, as it is hoped they may shed some light on general attitudes
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toward aggression, especially when females are the victims of the 
aggressive behavior.
As was mentioned earlier, many of the aggression studies have 
utilized a paradigm originally designed by Buss (1963). In the Buss 
procedure, the experiment is presented to the subjects as being an 
investigation of the effects of punishment (i.e., shock) on verbal 
learning. The experimenter’s confederate, who is posing as a subject, 
is then chosen to be the "learner", while the real subject acts as 
the "teacher", shocking the learner each time he or she fails to per­
form the learning task correctly. Intensity of the shock delivered 
is defined as the measure of a subject's aggressiveness toward the 
victim. A few other studies have used procedures other than the Buss 
paradigm. Most notable are those investigations which have utilized 
nonhurtful foam bats (Young, Beier, Beier, & Barton, 1975), horn- 
honking (Deaux, 1971; Unger, Raymond, & Levine, 1974), and the Milgram 
(1974) paradigm (Niedorf, 1970) in the examination of aggressive 
behavior. Such analogues of aggressive behavior are not of course 
directly transferable to behavior in non-laboratory situations. How­
ever, it seems reasonable to assume that the findings of such analogue 
studies can, as stated above, give some useful clues to attitudes 
toward aggressive behavior and the victims thereof.
Frodi, (1977), in their review of the experimental lit­
erature on adult female and male aggression, found that the majority 
of studies demonstrated that both men and women behave less aggress­
ively toward women than toward men (Buss, 1966; Taylor & Epstein,
1967; Taylor & Smith, 1974). Additionally, Buss and his colleagues
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discovered that aggression toward female victims aroused more guilt 
and opposition to using shock in both males and females (Brock &
Buss, 1962, 1964; Buss, 1963; Buss & Brock, 1963).
On the other hand, Frdoi, ejt (1977) reviewed four studies 
which showed no differences in aggression toward male and female 
victims Cbarson, Coleman, Forbes & Johnsom, 1972; Levitt & Viney,
1973; Silverman, 1971; Lando, Johnson-Payne, Gilbert, & Deutsch, Note 
2), and three studies which showed that an opposite-sex victim is 
more likely to be aggressed against than a same-sex victim (Deaux, 
1971; Jaffe, Malamuth, Feingold, & Feshbach, 1974; Titley & Viney, 
1969).
In one study using a variation of the Buss paradigm, Taylor 
and Epstein (1967) demonstrated that initial differences in aggression 
toward male and female victims seemed to disappear when male and fe­
male subjects were confronted with an increasingly aggressive oppo­
site-sex partner (confederate), who continued to increase the inte- 
sity of the shock which the subject received for losing in a competi­
tive task. Thus, in return, both male and female subjects increased 
the intensity of shock which male and female partners received, when 
given the chance to retaliate. The authors suggest that these re­
sults may reflect a reaction to "violation of social expectation"
(p. 484), whereby male and female subjects felt they were excused 
from the usual sex role requirements, when the opposite-sex partner 
appeared to be aggressing toward them without justification.
In a similar vein. Young, e_t a]̂ . (1975) also found that male 
subjects who felt that their social expectations of women had been
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violated excused themselves from the usual requirement that they not 
be aggressive toward women. Men, whom it had been assessed believed 
that women should take a traditional role in society, increased 
their aggressive behavior toward a female partner when she behaved 
aggressively toward them. On the other hand, men who were not opposed 
to women taking non-traditional roles showed relatively high aggression 
both before and after their female partner behaved aggressively toward 
them.
Kaleta and Buss (Note 3), in a study which seems to support 
the findings of Young, et al. (1975), also found that a failure to 
meet societal norms caused female victims to be shocked more severely. 
In this study, the female victim varied her behavior and her appearance 
such that she appeared more or less feminine in a number of conditions. 
Results indicated that women who were feminine in both behavior and 
appearance received the lowest shock intensities, while women who 
were unfeminine in behavior and appearance received the highest shock. 
The authors concluded that although our society has norms which say 
not to harm women, if the woman chooses to forsake the feminine role 
(e.g., by acting assertively or aggressively), her aggressor may also 
forsake his normative beliefs.
It might be concluded from the above data, then, that highly 
aggressive behavior directed at women is not entirely approved of 
by either men or women. However, the results of the Taylor and 
Epstein (1967) study, as well as the findings of Young, et al. (1975) 
and Kaleta and Buss (Note 3), suggest that this may only be so as 
long as the female victim fulfills certain sex role expectations.
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It might be hypothesized, then* that in the case of a wife-battering 
situation, observers might be less disapproving of male aggression 
toward a female, if she has violated sex role expectations by act­
ing aggressively, either verbally or physically, prior to the inci­
dent.
In terms of empathy for the victims of aggressive behavior, Buss 
(1966) found that female subjects expressed more concern for a victim 
(male or female) who claimed to have been hurt by the shock proced­
ure than the male subjects did. Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) presented 
similar results which indicated that women are generally more empathie 
than men towards shock victims.
In a study by Titley and Viney (1969), in which subjects were 
informed that their shock victims were either disabled or nondisabled 
it was discovered that women set much lower shock Intensities for 
disabled victims than for nondisabled victims, while men did not.
The authors felt that these results offered support for Buss' findings 
that women tend to be more empathie toward victims of aggression.
These results were later replicated by Levitt and Viney (1973).
Similarly, two other studies (Milgram, 1974; Niedorf, 1970), 
both using the Milgram paradigm, found that women were more upset 
than men by the experimental situation, in ways that reflected empathy 
for the victim. The Milgram, paradigm, it should be noted, is very 
much like the procedure employed by Buss (1963), although it requires 
subjects to set ever increasing shock intensities for the victim and 
involved having the experimenter remain with the subjects to urge 
them to do so.
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In summary, the bulk of the aggression literature concerned 
with empathy seems to support Buss' (1966) early work, which suggested 
that sex differences do exist in terms of empathy for a victim of 
induced shock. These findings are not inconsistent with those of 
several other studies which have indicated that women experience 
significantly more guilt and anxiety in a shock situation than men 
did, especially when the victim is female (Brock & Buss, 1962, 1964; 
Buss & Brock, 1963).
The aggression literature as a whole, then, though not directly 
related to how people may perceive marital violence, appears to give 
some clues to how observers perceive aggression toward a female. It 
would appear that, in general, both men and women do not entirely 
approve of highly aggressive behavior toward a female victim, and that 
women appear to express more concern and empathy for a victim than 
men do. However, as Taylor and Epstein's (1967) work suggests, these 
generalities may only stand as long as the victim does not violate 
sex role expectations, and does not appear to "deserve" the aggressive 
behavior. Thus, it might be expected that perceptions of marital 
violence might be influenced by what appears to be a violation of 
social expectations, on the part of the woman, whereby the observer 
may feel that retaliation is justifiable if the woman has acted aggre­
ssively , either physically or verbally. This supposition, based on 
the experimental evidence, is not, as we have seen, vastly different 
from what actually appears to be the case, according to Celles (1972) 
and others.
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Victim Derogation and Attribution of Responsibility
Symonds (1975) and others (e.g., Pogrebin, 1974; Sands, 1976) 
have commented at length on the tendency of most people to be reluc­
tant or resistant to believing In the Innocence of the victims of 
violent crimes— particularly victims of rape and marital violence.
This reluctance, attests Symonds, can be seen In community responses, 
police behavior, the family's reactions to the victims, and. Interest­
ingly, by the victims themselves.
Experimental Investigations In the area of social psychology 
have resulted In the development by Lemer and his associates (Lerner, 
1970; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) of a construct which explains to a cer­
tain extent this phenomenon of victim devaluation, and the concomi­
tant attribution of responsibility for the crime to the victim. Known 
as "belief In a just world", this construct refers to the tendency of 
most people to believe that they live In a just world where people 
get what they deserve and deserve what they get. Belief In a just 
world was used by Lerner to explain the fact that, under certain 
circumstances. Innocent victims are blamed for their misfortunes.
His reasoning was that derogating the victim helps the observer main­
tain his belief that the world Is just, because he can see the victim 
as deserving his or her fate. Deservedness, according to Lemer, con­
sists of two components: personal worth and behavior. Thus, observers
of a violent crime may either conclude that the victim Is an undesIre- 
able person with undesIreable traits and "deserved it anyhow" (e.g., 
Lincoln & Levlnger, 1972) or that the victim, though desIreable, was
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partially responsible for what has happened because of his or her 
behavior (e.g., Chaikin & Darley, 1973).
At any rate, although they will not be reviewed here, numerous 
studies have appeared in the literature which seem to confirm Lerner's 
"just world" explanation of the tendency to derogate victims (see 
Lerner & Miller, 1978 for review). Also, several investigators (e.g., 
Jones & Aronson, 1973) have demonstrated that this tendency does have 
a tremendous impact on the outcomes of simulated jury trials. This 
research will be discussed in more detail in the following section of 
this review.
Such research definitely sheds some light on why many individuals 
continue to hold as true a number of beliefs about victims of marital 
violence, as well as victims of rape. As Symonds (1975) has postulated, 
these beliefs seem to fill the basic need of all individuals to find 
a rational explanation for violence: "Exposure to senseless,
irrational behavior upsets everyone and makes them feel confused, vul­
nerable, and helpless. It is tremendously relieving to believe that 
the victim has somehow done something that plausibly contributed to 
the crime of violence..." (p. 92). Apparently, then, believing that 
the victim of marital violence "deserved it" or that her aggressor was 
not responsible for what he did, due to intoxication, may fulfill the 
need to understand why such violence occurred in the first place. Un­
fortunately, this need to believe in a "just world" is often fulfilled 
at the expense of the victim of wife-battering. As one battered woman 
interviewed by Adrian and Mitchell (1978) stated, "I don't know how 
to get across this shame that is connected with being a battered wife.
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The people, the public, always assume you deserve it.,.'* (p. 10),
In conclusion, Lerner*s construct of "belief in a just world" 
seems to explain somewhat the tendency of many individuals to devalue 
victims in general and attribute responsibility to them for what has 
happened. Also, as has already been mentioned, it would seem likely 
that such a construct would have a great deal of impact on jurors* per­
ceptions of conjugal assault cases.
Simulated Jury Research
In recent years social psychologists have begun to turn their 
attention to examining experimental analogues to the judicial system 
in order to discover whether jurors use extra-evidential devices in 
arriving at decisions regarding responsibility and degree of punishment 
for illegal actions. Gerbasi, Zuckerman, and Reis (1977), in their 
review of simulated jury research, found that a number of extralegal 
factors appear to contribute to simulated jurors* verdicts, including 
the characteristics of the jurors, and the characteristics of the vic­
tim and defendant.
In cases which have been concerned with crimes Involving a vic­
tim, it has been noted by Gerbasi, ejt ad. (1977) that Lemer's (1970) 
personality construct of *'belief in a just world" often results in the 
attribution of fault for a crime to the victim by simulated jurors.
For example, Jones and Aronson (1973) found that less severe prison 
sentences were recommended by simulated jurors for the defendant in a 
rape case, and greater attribution of fault for the crime was made to 
the character of the victim, when the victim was a divorcee (less
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respectable) than when the victim was married or a virgin (most respec­
table). Apparently, suggested the authors, the jurors were more com­
fortable devaluing a less respectable victim and were thus able to 
attribute more responsibility for the crime to her.
In a similar study, Zuckerman and Gerbasi (Note 4) presented to 
subjects an account of a rape, along with the Just World Scale (JWS) 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1973). It was found that subjects with high scores 
on the JWS (high belief in a just world) assigned more responsibility 
to the rape victim than did low JWS subjects. These results appear to 
support Lemer’s (1970) reasoning that people may ^old a victim of 
violence responsible for his or her fate in order to preserve their 
belief in a just world.
Other investigators have discovered that devaluation of the victim 
is not the only way jurors maintain their belief in a just world.
They may also attempt to restore justice by demanding harsher punish­
ment for the defendant. Rubin and Peplau (1975) reported that sub­
jects with a high belief in a just world assigned stiffer sentences 
than did subjects with a low belief in a just world. Gerbasi and 
Zuckerman (Note 5) have also found that high JWS subjects give more 
severe sentences.
Several studies have also attempted to gather information about 
the relationship between characteristics of defendants and victims 
and trial outcomes. Briefly, it has been found that mock jurors tend 
to give more severe sentences to defendants who harm high status vic­
tims (Landy & Aronson, 1969), that defendants with positive charac­
teristics are treated more leniently than those who are negatively
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described (Dowdle, Gillen, & Miller, 1974), and that mock jurors 
tend to give less severe sentences to defendants whom they perceive 
to be similar to themselves (Gerbasi & Zuckerman, Note 5),
In summary, it can be seen that certain extra-evidential factors 
do indeed play a role in simulated jurors' verdicts. Those studies 
concerning factors which appear to be relevant to this literature 
review seem to indicate that jurors' decisions may be influenced by 
the individual juror's personality traits (e.g., "belief in a just 
world"), as well as by the characteristics of the defendant and vic­
tim. Although mock jury research has been concerned with crimes 
which involved rape (Jones & Aronson, 1973), murder (Landy & Aronson, 
1969), and assault (Austin, Walster & Utne, 1976), in all cases, the 
victim of these crimes was unknown to the defendant prior to the vio­
lent incident. Clearly, the literature discussed earlier concerning 
beliefs about marital violence indicates that many people feel that 
the existence of a marital relationship between two people changes 
somewhat the norms governing the use of violence. Additionally, 
stereotypes of what battered wives are like, as well as assumptions 
about responsibility and self-control, appear to color to a certain 
extent observers' perceptions of the rightness or wrongness of 
violence within a marriage. Given these sociological findings, 
coupled with the experimental evidence already discussed, it seems 
likely that mock jurors' decisions in a wife-battering case would be 
based on more than just the evidence provided and the law as it stands 
concerning assault.
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Simulated Jury Research Methodology
As has been noted already, Interest in research concerning juris­
prudence has been increasing in the last few years. Recently, Roberts 
and his colleagues have pointed out that as the results of this type 
of research are used more frequently by the judicial system, it becomes 
more and more important that these results have as much validity as 
possible (Roberts, Hoffman, & Johnson, 1978). Although some inves­
tigators have attempted to insure this validity by studying actual 
juries in the process of decision-making (e.g., Reed, 1965), Gerbasi, 
et all (1977) have noted that a number of problems existent in the 
majority of jury studies, most of which are analogues, make it diffi­
cult to generalize laboratory findings to non-laboratory situations.
Foremost among these problems is the fact that the majority of 
trial outcome studies have been based on individual mock juror's 
decisions; that is, in almost none of the studies reviewed by Gerbasi, 
et al. did the simulated jurors participate in a deliberation process. 
There is a great deal of evidence from the field of social psychology 
supporting the notion that individuals in groups behave differently from 
individuals alone (e.g., Asch, 1953; Kogan & Wallach, 1964), and, 
recently a number of investigators have been examining the effects of 
group deliberation on trial outcomes. In a study by Izzett and Leginski
(1974) where the status of the defendant was varied, it was found 
that after group deliberation, individual jurors recommended more lenient 
prison terms for the low status defendant. Although the deliberation 
procedure produced a significant change in the direction of leniency
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for the low status defendant, it did not produce any changes in the 
sentencing of the high status defendant. More recently, Roberts, 
et al. (1978) also found that jurors were more lenient after delib­
erating as a group. Finally, Myers and Kaplan (1976), in an inves­
tigation where simulated jurors read high- and low-guilt cases, found 
that group deliberation served to polarize the judgements of guilt 
and the severity of the prison sentence recommended by the jurors. 
Clearly, the findings of these three studies point to the methodo­
logical importance of group discussion in the execution of mock jury 
studies, especially when some degree of generalizability to the actual 
courtroom is the desired goal.
Gerbasi, et al. have also noted that generalization from labor­
atory findings is often made difficult by the fact that mock jurors 
know that their decisions will have no consequences. Recent studies 
by Kerr, Nerenz, & Herrick (Note 6) and by Diamond and Zeisel (1974) 
have attempted to explore this problem. Kerr, eit al. compared the 
decisions of six-person simulated juries and six-person actual juries 
in a case concerning the discipline of a college student. No signifi­
cant differences were found between the predeliberation verdicts of the 
mock and real jurors. Likewise, the group verdicts of the mock and 
real jurors did not differ. Unfortunately, the authors point out 
that the "real" jurors in this particular investigation knew that their 
verdict alone would not decide the student’s fate, as school authori­
ties would also be involved in passing judgement on the student. This, 
said the authors, could have allowed ample opportunity for diffusion 
of responsibility and the general feeling, on the part of the "real"
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jurors, that their vote was of no real consequence.
Along similar lines. Diamond and Zeisel (1974) compared the ver­
dicts of three different types of juries for 10 different actual 
court trials. The first type of jury was the actual one, chosen by 
the attorneys, while the second type of jury was made up of potential 
jurors who had been rejected by one or the other attorney, and the 
third type was composed of individuals chosen at random. Only half 
of the real juries returned guilty verdicts for the 10 trials, whereas 
all 10 of the randomly chosen juries and 8 of the 10 juries composed 
of rejected jurors voted guilty. Diamond and Zeisel suggest that be­
cause the two juries were made up of random and rejected jurors who 
knew that their verdicts would not determine the outcomes of the trials 
they apparently assumed different standards of reasonable doubt as 
far as the evidence in the trial was concerned.
Gerbasi, ^  al. conclude from the data of the above two studies 
that although a number of questions remain concerning the generaliza­
bility of jury research, some degree of generalizability seems 
"cautiously appropriate" (p. 343), They further suggest that the 
"mundane realism" of jury research be increased in the future, although 
no suggestions were made as to how this might be accomplished. Cer­
tainly, the entire area of the problem of generalizability of simu­
lated jury research is a fruitful one for further research, as Gerbasi, 
et al, have noted.
Other specific aspects of jury research methodology, including 
the size of juries, the types of decision rules used, and evidence 
presentation, have also been reviewed by Gerbasi, et al. Briefly,
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their review of the pertinent literature suggests that, in terms of 
number of jurors, when the incriminating evidence is weak, the ver­
dicts of 6- and 12-person juries tend to be equal. However, when the 
evidence is strong, it is to the defendant's advantage to have a 
12-person jury, as this maximizes the probability that more than one 
of its members will think the defendant is not guilty and hold out for 
a hung jury (see Valenti & Downing, 1975),
In terms of the types of decision rules (i.e., the type of agree­
ment necessary for a verdict to be valid), only one study has exam­
ined the effects of manipulating the assigned decision rule (unanimous 
or majority rule). Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, and Davis (1975), 
in a study where subjects were given evidence in a rape case that was 
designed to maximize juror disagreement, found that majority rule 
juries took less time and fewer polls to reach their verdict. Juries 
deliberating under a decision rule of unanimity, on the other hand, 
were much more likely to be hung. It can be seen that since such fac­
tors as the number of jurors and the type of decision rule have such 
a significant effect on mock trial outcomes, the need for standardiza­
tion in future simulated jury research is great.
Finally, the matter of presentation of evidence in mock jury 
studies, including the order of presentation of evidence (prosecution 
and defense) and the number of defense and prosecution arguments, has 
also been examined by a number of investigators. Stone (1969), in a 
study investigating the importance of order of case arguments, found 
that order of presentation did not affect the final verdicts. However, 
more recently. Walker, Thibaut, and Andreoli (1972) found that the
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party that presented second had a greater effect on the jury than the 
party that presented first, regardless of whether It was the defense 
or the prosecution. The authors concluded that the present system, 
in which the prosecution presents first and the defense second, is 
most fair to the defense, as it gives the defendant the greatest 
opportunity to be found not guilty. Results of another study done 
by Thibaut, Walker, and Lind (1972) also indicate that evidence pre­
sented second has a stronger effect on mock jurors* verdicts.
The relationship between the number of defense and prosecution 
arguments and mock jurors’ perception of guilt has been examined by 
Calder, Insko, and Yandell (1974), in a series of studies. Their 
findings supported the hypothesis that perception of guilt would be 
related to the number of defense and prosecution arguments put forth. 
That is, it was found that jurors who had read one defense argument 
and four prosecution arguments were more likely to find the defendant 
guilty than were jurors who read four defense arguments and one prose­
cution argument. Summarizing these findings, Gerbasi, eĵ  al. state 
that since the order and number of defense and prosecution arguments 
seem to be important factors in trial outcome, these factors should be 
considered more frequently in the interpretation of simulated jury find­
ings, as well as in the design of future studies. Once again, greater 
standardization appears to be necessary with regard to such factors.
In conclusion, it appears that although analogues of jury pro­
cesses have yielded a great deal of important information, methodo­
logical problems have made it difficult to compare various studies 
and generalize laboratory findings to actual juries. Gerbasi, ^  al.
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and other workers in the field of jury research have made a number 
of suggestions concerning the importance of group deliberation and 
standardization in such research. Hopefully these suggestions will 
come to be applied in future research in this area.
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES
The present investigation was designed to explore the effect 
that evidence from a hypothetical conjugal assault case would have 
on mock jurors’ perceptions of a defendant’s guilt. It also attempted 
to assess the impact of two situational variables, victim provocation 
and intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors’ verdicts and recommen­
dations for sentencing. Finally, the current study was also designed 
to examine the relationship between jurors’ perceptions of guilt and 
general views of the role of women in society.
Hypothesis One
Given the findings of both sociological and social psychological 
research concerning attitudes toward female victims, particularly 
victims of wife abuse, it was hypothesized that when the evidence pre­
sented to simulated jurors indicated the victim may have provoked her 
assaulter prior to the incident (Conditions I and III), jurors would 
have a greater tendency to perceive the defendant as not guilty than 
when there was no indication of victim provocation (Conditions II and 
IV). Both pre-deliberation or individual verdicts and post-delibera- 
tion or group verdicts were examined, since there was evidence that 
the two might differ.
Hypothesis Two
As with the first hypothesisi on the basis of the literature review
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it was hypothesized that when the evidence indicated victim provocation, 
individual mock jurors, if they found the defendant guilty on the pre­
deliberation questionnaires, would tend to recommend more lenient 
prison terms for the defendant than when there was no evidence of vic­
tim provocation. Recommended prison sentences were measured in months 
and years of actual imprisonment.
Hypothesis Three
Again, since previous research provides some support for the notion 
that people tend to assume that alcoholic intoxication excuses a 
loss in self-control, it was hypothesized that jurors would be more 
likely to perceive a defendant as not guilty when there was evidence 
that he was intoxicated prior to the assault (Conditions I and II) , 
than when there was evidence that he was not (Conditions III and IV). 
Again, both pre-deliberation and post-deliberation verdicts were examined. 
Hypothesis Four
Likewise, it was hypothesized that individual jurors, if they 
found the defendant guilty on the pre-deliberation questionnaires, 
would tend to recommend more lenient prison sentences when there was 
evidence that the defendant was intoxicated than when there was evi­
dence that he was not.
Hypothesis Five
Since previous research suggests that individuals with tradi­
tional views of the role of women in society are more likely to react 
negatively to women who do not fulfill sex role expectations (e.g., by 
acting aggressively), it was hypothesized that individual juors with 
traditional views of women, when presented with evidence that the
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female victim of the battering may have acted aggressively prior to 
the battering incident, would be less likely to find the defendant 
guilty on the pre-deliberation questionnaires than jurors with non- 
traditional views. No other hypotheses were made concerning the rela­
tionship of individual verdicts to views of the role of women, due 
to the exploratory nature of the present investigation.
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD
Subjects
174 subjects (85 males, 89 females) were selected from Univer­
sity of Montana introductory and developmental psychology classes.
All had previously completed a short, 25-item version of the Attitudes 
toward Women Scale (AWS, see Appendix A) (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 
1973). These students were contacted by phone and asked to participate 
in a study concerning judicial processes. Prospective subjects 
were further informed that they would receive experimental credit for 
their participation in the study. Each individual who agreed to par­
ticipate in the study was then randomly assigned to one of four exper­
imental conditions, with the constraint that at least 36 subjects (18 
males, 18 females) were assigned to each experimental condition.
Experimental Design
The design of the present investigation is depicted in Table 1.
The experimental conditions represent a 2X2 factorial design, with 
victim information (Provocation vs. No Provocation), and defendant 
information (Intoxication vs. No Intoxication), serving as between- 
subject variables. More specifically, all subjects received a court 
case summary involving charges stemming from an alleged incident in 
which a woman was beaten by her husband. However, half of the sub-
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Experimental
Conditions N Provocation No Provocation
Intoxication 96 I
n=45 
(21 maies,
24 females)
II 
n=41 
(21 maies,
20 females)
No Intoxication 88 III 
n=43 
(20 maies,
23 females)
IV 
n=45 
(23 maies,
22 females)
Total 174 88 86
TABLE 1
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
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jects received information in the summary which indicated that the 
victim had been verbally abusive to her husband and slapped him prior 
to the beating (Provocation), while the other subjects received infor­
mation which indicated that the victim did nothing to provoke the 
battering incident (No Provocation). Likewise, case summaries either 
indicated that the husband (defendant) was intoxicated at the time the 
battering incident took place, or that he was sober. The four exper­
imental conditions, then, included: 1) Provocation-Intoxication, 2) No 
Provocation-Intoxication, 3) Provocation-No Intoxication, and 4) No 
Provocation-No Intoxication. As noted earlier, a balanced number of 
males and females were assigned to each of the four conditions.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions at the time of initial contact. Each of the four experi­
mental conditions was then administered once on each of three consecu­
tive days at the Clinical Psychology Center at the University of Montana 
(12 sessions total), with 12 subjects minimum (six males, six females) 
assigned to each of the sessions. Subjects who had been assigned to 
different conditions were not mixed; rather, all subjects in each 
session received the same case summary information concerning the 
incident.
It should be noted here that, in order to ensure that at least a 
minimum of 12 subjects arrived for each session, 16 subjects were 
asked to participate in each scheduled session. All subjects who 
appeared for the session were allowed to participate in the first half 
of the procedure (i.e., they were asked to read the case summary and
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render an individual verdict). However, at the point in the procedure 
where subjects were assigned to six-person juries in order to render 
a group verdict, those subjects who exceeded the 12 needed to form two 
six-person juries were randomly selected out, debriefed, and dismissed.
The order of administration for the four experimental conditions 
was rotated each day, such that on the first day. Condition I was 
scheduled to run first. Condition II second. Condition III third, and 
Condition IV fourth. On the second day. Condition II was scheduled 
first. Condition III second. Condition IV third, and Condition I fourth, 
while on the third day. Condition III was scheduled first. Condition IV 
second. Condition I third, and Condition II fourth. It was intended 
that this rotation of the four conditions would control for confounding 
effects which could be produced by scheduling each condition at the 
same time each day (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Upon arrival at the session, subjects were assigned a subject 
number and given an experimental booklet (see Appendix B) containing
1) general instructions, 2) a description of the alleged battering 
incident, 3) a trial summary (prosecution’s case and defense’s case),
4) instructions concerning the laws relevant to the case, and 5) a brief 
questionnaire on which the subjects would record their individual 
verdicts. The description of the battering incident, as well as the 
trial summary, were derived from information provided by both the 
Missoula Conty Attorney’s Office and Celles’ interviews with battered 
wives (1972).
General introductory instructions consisted of the following;
Please read the following description of an incident 
and the court proceedings which resulted. You are asked
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to render a verdict on the basis of the evidence presented.
This description includes the main points from an actual 
trial. The information which you provide will be used to 
help formulate policy for dealing with similar cases, so it 
is very important that you imagine yourself to be in a 
courtroom situation and assume that you are an actual mem­
ber of the jury. PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THE PARTICULARS OF 
THIS CASE OR YOUR VERDICT WITH THE OTHER PEOPLE PRESENT 
UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
The general charges concerning the incident in question were 
then presented in a summary brief as follows, with those sentences 
in brackets being either left out or included depending on the exper­
imental condition;
On the evening of July 18, 1978, Mrs, Carole Jones 
. (age 31) states that she was assaulted by her husband,
William Jones (age 32), in the kitchen of their home.
According to Mrs. Jones, her husband arrived home at approx­
imately 10:30 PM. (Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones
states he appeared to be very drunk at the time.)
(No Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones states he did not
appear to have been drinking before coming home.) When 
Mrs. Jones asked her husband where he had been that 
evening, she says he became very angry, shouted at her, and 
began kicking the kitchen furniture. (Provocation Con­
dition: At that point, Mrs. Jones says she became very
angry and began shouting back at him and calling him 
names, including "lousy b^" and "stupid bastard". Then, 
when Mr. Jones began kicking the furniture, Mrs. Jones states 
that she slapped him on the arm once and told him to 
"cut it out".) She asserts that then Mr. Jones struck 
her on the left side of the head. When it began to "look 
like trouble", Mrs. Jones says she moved towards the phone 
with the intent to summon help. Mrs. Jones states her 
husband then attempted to take the phone away from her 
at that point and struck her several more times on the head 
and face with the phone receiver, until she broke away from 
him and ran to the neighbors* home next door,
A trial summary of first the prosecution's case and then the 
defense's case was presented next. Each case contained an equal num­
ber of arguments, as recommended by Calder, et al.(1974). The pro­
secution's case consisted of the following:
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1) The prosecution first called Mr. Tom Steck, neighbor 
of Mr. and Mrs. Jones to testify. According to Mr.
Steck, on the evening of July 18, 1978, he and his wife 
heard a knock at the front door and answered it. They 
found Mrs. Jones without her glasses and with blood on 
her face and clothes. Mrs. Steck then called 911, the 
emergency number. Looking out the window, Mr. Steck
sawMr. Jones get into his car and leave. Mr. Steck
said he then went with Mrs. Jones to her house and 
waited in the driveway for the police.
2) The prosecution then submitted the report of the investi­
gating officer, James Hailey. According to Hailey, when 
he arrived at the scene, Mr. Jones had left and Mrs. Jones 
was in the house bleeding moderately from the nose. He 
stated it looked as though her nose could be broken.
There was also a large bruise on her left temple, and her 
left eye was very swollen. There was blood on Mrs. Jones' 
shirt, and on the floor of the kitchen. When asked, Mrs.
Jones said that she wished to sign a complaint, and Officer
Hailey took a written statement from her about the inci­
dent,
3) Hospital records submitted by the prosecution showed 
that upon admittance to the emergency room, Mrs. Jones 
stated that she had been beaten up by her husband. Her 
nose was bleeding and her left eye was swollen shut.
Subsequent examination revealed a broken nose and hemo­
rrhaging left eye.
4) In its closing argument, the prosecution stated that it 
had proven its case by presenting the charges made by Mrs. 
Jones, the testimony of her neighbor and the investigating 
officer, and by submitting hospital records which detailed 
the extent of Mrs. Jones' injuries. In addition, the pro­
secution noted that it was very unlikely their client con­
cocted the beating story so quickly and in so much detail 
under the circumstances described.
The defense's case was summarized as follows, with those sentences 
in brackets being either left out or included depending on the exper­
imental condition:
1) The defense first called Mr. Jones to testify in his own 
behalf. Mr. Jones stated that he had not been angry about 
being asked by his wife, Carole, where he had been on the 
evening of July IS, 1978, and denied shouting at her and 
"kicking furniture around". Instead, he stated that his 
wife was extremely upset with him for coming home at such
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a late hour (Provocation Condition; and began being both 
verbally and physically abusive of him). He asserted that 
she then grabbed the telephone receive and came at him, 
as if she was going to strike him with it.
2) According to Mr, Jones, he then struggled with his wife 
in an effort to get the phone out of her hands, so as to 
protect himself. He admitted that it was possible that 
his wife may have received blows to the head at that time, 
but he denied that he ever intentionally struck his wife 
or intended to harm her in any way, (intoxication Con­
dition: He admitted he had been drinking heavily before
coming home,) (No Intoxication Condition: He stated that
he had not been drinking before coming home,) He further 
stated that he had no idea she was hurt badly at the time 
and so left the scene in order to allow his wife to "cool 
off",
3) Next, the defense called Dr, H,R, Brown, a local physician, 
to the stand. According to Dr, Brown, there was nothing in 
the hospital records submitted by the prosecution which 
would indicate that Mrs, Jones' injuries were intentionally 
caused. He clarified this statement by saying that the 
hospital records did not prove, one way or the other, 
whether or not the injuries were accidentally or inten­
tionally caused,
4) In its closing argument, the defense attested that their
client acted in self-defense during the incident in ques­
tion, and in no way intended to harm his wife. Any blows 
received by Mrs, Jones, the defense further stated, were 
entirely accidental. In addition, the defense felt that 
the hospital records submitted by the prosecution did not 
rule out the possibility that the pattern of injuries re­
ceived by Mrs, Jones could have been accidentally caused.
Next, instructions concerning the laws relevant to the case were 
given. These included the following:
1, You are instructed that a person commits the offense of 
assault if he purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury 
to another,
2, You are instructed that the term "bodily injury" means phy­
sical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condi­
tion and includes mental illness or impairment,
3, You are instructed that a person is justified in the use of 
force or threat to use force against another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is nec-
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essary to defend himself or another against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified 
in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily 
harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is 
necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm 
to himself or another, or to prevent the commision of a 
forcible felony.
Additionally, jurors were given the following final instructions;
After weighing these points, you must decide whether 
the evidence has convinced you of the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If any such doubt causes a feeling 
of hesitation and dissatisfaction in your mind which will 
not permit you to rest on a verdict of guilty by the 
evidence, then, by law, you are to find the defendant not 
guilty.
The law forbids you to be governed by sentiment, sym­
pathy, passion, prejudice or public opinion. Both the 
State and the defendant have the right to expect that you 
will faithfully and fairly consider and weigh the evidence 
and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just 
verdict, without considering what the consequences or sentence 
will be.
Finally, a brief questionnaire was given to the subjects concern­
ing the individual subject's verdict, recommended sentencing (if the 
subject found the defendant guilty), and confidence in the verdict 
rendered :
1) Now we would like you to indicate your verdict. Please 
feel free to review all instructions and information.
As a juror, I find the defendant: (circle one)
a) guilty
b) not guilty
2) If you voted "guilty" above, what would your recommended 
sentence (actual time in jail) be?
a) Maximum sentence of 5 years
b) Maximum sentence of 2-3 years
c) Maximum sentence of 1 year
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d) Maximum sentence of 8 months
e) Maximum sentence of 6 months
f) Maximum sentence of 2 months
g) Maximum sentence of 30 days or less
3) How confident are you of your verdict? (circle one)
a) Extremely confident of verdict
b) Strongly confident of verdict
c) Moderately confident
d) Slightly confident
e) Unsure of verdict
After distribution of the booklets, the experimental assistant 
stated that the purpose of the study was "to study the manner in which 
people judge various crimes". It should be noted that the experi­
mental assistant was always blind to the conditions which were being 
administered. The experimental assistant then instructed the subjects 
to read the booklets carefully, while she read the instructions aloud 
to them. After reading the instructions, the assistant then announced 
that they would have 15 minutes in which to read the case material 
and render a verdict on the last page of the booklet. Subjects were 
asked to turn in their questionnaires when they had completed them. 
Each questionnaire was marked with the appropriate subject number, and 
subjects were told that the questionnaires were only to be associated 
with their subject number and not with their names.
If there were any questions concerning the task, the assistant 
attempted to answer them by paraphrasing the written instructions. 
Subjects were asked to defer questions concerning the purpose of the
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study and Its hypotheses until after the experiment was completed.
The experimental assistant then remained with the subjects during the 
15 minute period. Those subjects who finished the task before the 
15 minutes were up were given a magazine to read until all the sub­
jects had finished.
As was mentioned earlier, following the collection of all the 
individual verdict questionnaires, those subjects who exceeded the 
12 needed to form two six-person juries were randomly selected out, 
debriefed in a separate room, and dismissed. The 12 remaining sub­
jects were then randomly divided into two six-person jury groups, with 
the constraint that there be three males and three females on each 
jury, and placed in separate rooms.
The experimental assistant then read aloud the following instruc­
tions :
You are now being asked, as a group, to render an unanimous,
I repeat, unanimous, verdict on the basis of the evidence 
presented. As was mentioned earlier, the information you 
provide will be used to help formulate policy for dealing 
with similar cases, so it is very important that you imagine 
yourselves to be in a courtroom situation and assume that you 
are all actual members of a jury.
Subjects were then advised to retain their case summary information 
and encouraged to consult this information to facilitate decision­
making, The jury groups were instructed by the experimental assis­
tant to elect a foreman in whatever fashion they wished. Subjects 
were further instructed to delegate the following responsibilities 
to the selected foreman: 1) maintaining order, 2) keeping track of
the time, and 3) reporting the verdict to the experimental assistant
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when it was reached. After delivering these instructions, the assis­
tant announced that they would have 30 minutes to deliberate after 
choosing a foreman, and that she would remain in the room to monitor 
their progress. The assistant then retired to one end of the room to 
unobtrusively take notes, and did not interfere further in the delib­
eration process.
If, at the end of 30 minutes, the jury had not reached an unan­
imous verdict, the experimental assistant instructed them to reconvene 
and continue deliberating the case for an additional 15 minutes. If, 
at the end of 15 minutes, an unanimous decision still had not been 
reached, the experimental assistant would record this.
After the verdict was reported and recorded, the experimental 
assistant distributed to the subjects a final questionnaire, concern­
ing each subject's perceptions of the victim, the defendant, and the 
case in general (see Appendix C). The pertinent questions, which 
follow, were imbedded in four other general questions concerning the 
evidence presented:
1) Please rate the defendant, Mr. Jones, in terms of how much 
responsibility you feel he bears for the incident in ques­
tion: (circle one)
a) Completely responsible
b) Very responsible
c) Moderately responsible
d) Slightly responsible
e) Not at all responsible
2) Now, please rate Mrs. Jones in terms of how much responsi­
bility you feel she bears for the incident in question:
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a) Completely responsible
b) Very responsible
c) Moderately responsible
d) Slightly responsible
e) Not at all responsible
3) How confident would you be of your final verdict, if you 
were told that the couple involved in this case, Mr. and 
Mrs. Jones, reconciled and began living together again 
after the trial? (circle one)
a) Extremely confident of verdict
b) Strongly confident of verdict
c) Moderately confident
d) Slightly confident
e) Unsure of verdict
4) If your final verdict was "guilty", what would your recom­
mended sentence (actual time in jail) be?
a) Maximum sentence of 5 years
b) Maximum sentence of 2-3 years
c) Maximum sentence of 1 year
d) Maximum sentence of 8 months
e) Maximum sentence of 6 months
f) Maximum sentence of 2 months
g) Maximum sentence of 30 days or less
Once again, each questionnaire was marked with the appropriate sub­
ject number, and it was emphasized to the subjects that the question­
naires were only to be associated with their subject numbers and not 
with their names. Upon completion, the questionnaires were collected; 
subjects were then debriefed and told they would be credited with their 
participation in the study.
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The Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS)
As was mentioned, a short 25-item version of the Spence- 
Helmreich (1972) Attitudes toward Women Scale was administered prior 
to the present investigation. Administration of the AWS took place 
in a setting unconnected with the jury portion of the study, and at 
no time was the AWS said to be related to the jury investigation.
The AWS is composed of 25 statements describing attitudes 
toward the role of women in society (e.g., "Swearing and obscenity 
are more repulsive in the speech of a woman than of a man").
Subjects are asked to express their opinion about each of these state­
ments by indicating whether they 1) agree strongly, 2) agree mildly,
3) disagree mildly, or 4) disagree strongly with each statement. 
Responses are scored on a four point scale, with the most traditional 
alternative being scored a 0, and the least traditional alternative 
being scored a 3. Thus, the minimum score which an individual can 
receive is 0, while the maximum score possible is 75.
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS
Individual Verdicts
Subjects were first asked to render an individual verdict after 
perusing the case summary information provided. The percentages of 
guilty verdicts given individually by both male and female subjects 
in the four experimental conditions are shown in Table 2,
It was found that the inclusion of information in the case
summary indicating victim provocation produced significantly more 
guilty verdicts among the total number of subjects than when such 
information was not given (X*(l) = 4.96, £<;.05). However, when sub­
jects were divided by sex and the verdicts were reanalyzed, it was 
found that males were not significantly affected by the addition of 
information concerning victim provocation 0C*(1) ~ .46, .05). For
female subjects, on the other hand, information suggesting victim pro­
vocation yielded significant differences (X (1) “ 4.12, £ <".05), although 
not in the direction predicted. That is, when the female victim 
appeared to have elicited the battering incident by being both ver­
bally and physically abusive, female subjects were significantly more 
likely to find the defendant guilty than when the victim did nothing 
to provoke her attacker. Verdicts of male subjects, however, were un­
affected by the addition of such information concerning the incident.
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Provocation No Provocation
Intoxication I II
Males 71% (15) 71% (15)
Females 83% (20) 80% (16)
Total 77% (35) 76% (31)
No Intoxication III IV
Males 70% (14) 52% (12)
Females 87% (20) 50% (11)
Total 79% (34) 51% (23)
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGES AND NUMBER OF GUILTY VERDICTS 
AS A FUNCTION OF VICTIM AND DEFENDANT INFORMATION
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Manipulation of information concerning the intoxication or non­
intoxication of the defendant at the time of the battering incident 
produced non-significant results for the total number of subjects, 
males and females combined, CX\l) = 2.45, £>.05), for males alone 
(X*(l) = ,7, £>.05), and for females alone (X.̂ (l) = 1.36, £> ,05). 
Subjects, then, who were given information indicating the defendant 
was intoxicated during the battering incident were no more likely to 
find the defendant innocent than were those subjects given "No Intox­
ication" information.
Although a statistical analysis of the interaction between the 
two variables, victim provocation and defendant intoxication, was not 
possible using the test of significance given the present sample 
sizes, the interaction between these variables has been portrayed 
graphically in Figure 1, It can be seen that Conditions I, II, and 
III did not differ greatly in terms of the percentages of guilty 
verdicts given by both male and female subjects. Condition IV sub­
jects (No Provocation-No Intoxication), on the other hand, were much 
more likely to find the defendant not guilty than those subjects in 
Conditions I, II, and III. Only 51% of Condition IV subjects voted 
guilty as compared with 77%, 76%, and 79%, in Conditions I, II, and 
III respectively.
Group Verdicts
After rendering an individual verdict, subjects were divided 
into six-person jury groups and asked to render an unanimous group 
verdict. Since nearly half of the 24 group juries were unable to reach
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Figure 1. Percentages of guilty verdicts as a function of 
victim provocation and defendant Intoxication.
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an unanimous decision, statistical anlysis of those groups which 
did render an unanimous verdict (14 total) was not possible. However, 
the information which was obtained from this portion of the inves­
tigation is displayed in Figure 2. It can be seen that, as with indi­
vidual verdicts. Conditions I, II, and III do not differ greatly in 
terms of the number of guilty verdicts given by the group juries. 
Condition IV juries, however, were somewhat less likely to find the 
defendant guilty than juries in Conditions I, II, and III. None of 
the juries in Condition IV found the defendant guilty, while three 
juries in Condition I, three juries in Condition II, and four juries 
in Condition III found the defendant guilty.
Sentencing
Subjects who judged the defendant guilty were also asked for 
recommendations regarding sentencing. A total of 123 guilty verdicts 
were returned in the four conditions. It was found that manipulation 
of information concerning victim provocation and defendant intoxica­
tion did not significantly influence the severity of sentencing for 
male and female subjects combined (Provocation: X^(6) = 12.22, ^  .05;
Intoxication: X*(6) = 3.83, _£̂ >.05). It was noted, however, that the
difference between Provocation subjects’ verdicts and No Provocation 
subjects’ verdicts approached significance (X^6) = 12.22, £<.10), in 
the direction originally predicted. Thus, while defendant intoxication 
had no effect on subjects’ sentencing recommendations, subjects who 
received information suggesting victim provocation tended to recommend 
more lenient sentences for the defendant than subjects who did not 
receive such information.
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Figure 2. Group verdicts rendered by subjects in each experimental condition.
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Perceptions of Responsibility
Subjects who participated in the group deliberation portion of 
this investigation were also questioned as to their perceptions of the 
amount of responsibility borne by both the defendant and victim for 
the incident in question. It was found that the defendant who was pro­
voked was not seen to be any less responsible for the battering inci­
dent than the defendant who was not provoked OCW = 3.64, £^,05). 
Likewise, the provocative victim was not perceived as being any more 
responsible for the incident than the non-provocative victim ~
4,06, £^.05). In general, subjects perceived the defendant as being 
significantly more responsible than his victim for the incident, whether 
he had been provoked (')(̂ (4) = 20,02, 2. <;005) or not (^(4) = 32.22,
2 <. 005).
In terms of alcohol intoxication, the defendant who was intoxi­
cated at the time the battering took place was not seen to be any less 
responsible for the incident than the defendant who was not intoxicated 
at the time of the battering (X^(4) = 2.76, 2>.05). In general, as 
above, subjects perceived the defendant as being significantly more 
responsible than the victim for the incident, whether he was intoxicated 
OC'(4) = 31.94, £<.005) or not CX\4) = 15.89, £<.005).
Attitudes Toward Women
The median score for the 301 subjects who completed the Attitudes 
toward Women Scale (AWS) was found to fall between 53 and 54. Based 
on their score on the AWS, then, all subjects were designated as being 
either "Traditional" in their attitudes toward the role of women in 
society (scores^53) or "Non-traditional" (scores=^54).
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For those conditions where subjects received information indicating 
victim provocation (Conditions I and III), the effect of the individual 
subject's attitudes toward women on his or her individual verdict was 
tested. It was found that differences in AWS scores had no signifi­
cant effect on the total number of subjects' verdicts (̂ *(1) = .05, _£>.05), 
nor on male subjects alone (X^(l) = .00009, .05), or female subjects
alone (X\l) = .03, £>- .05). Thus, subjects having traditional atti­
tudes toward the role of women in society were no more likely to find 
the defendant innocent when his wife provoked the incident than those 
subjects having more non-traditional attitudes toward women.
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION
One of the primary purposes of the present investigation was to 
determine whether information indicating victim provocation in a case 
of marital violence would influence the decisions of simulated jurors.
It was found that the manipulation of such information did in fact 
affect jurors' verdicts, but not in the manner predicted. Jurors 
who received victim provocation information were much more likely to 
find the defendant guilty than those jurors who did not receive such 
information. This was contrary to what was originally postulated, as 
it had been expected that such victim information would produce a 
greater tendency to perceive the defendant as not guilty. However, it 
is interesting to note that when subjects* verdicts were divided accord­
ing to the sex of the subject, it became apparent that, actually, 
female jurors were most significantly affected by the addition of the vic­
tim provocation information, while male jurors were relatively uninflu­
enced by it. Although one may only speculate as to why this was the 
case, it is quite possible that when female jurors received the infor­
mation concerning the female victim’s provocative response to her hus­
band (calling him names, slapping him), this may have caused them to 
identify with the victim. If this was the case, it may be that female 
jurors imagined that the victim's verbal abuse of her husband was 
justified, i.e., that he was, in fact, the "lousy bum" she had labeled
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hlm. This Identification process, then, may have increased the ten­
dency for female jurors to react negatively to the defendant and thus
caused them to find him guilty of the crime of assault more often.
It was also predicted that information concerning victim pro­
vocation would produce more lenient sentences when jurors found the 
defendant guilty. Although the evidence supporting this prediction 
was not exceedingly strong, the tendency for jurors receiving victim 
provocation information to give more lenient sentences to the defen­
dant was there nonetheless. Although it might seem to, this finding 
does not actually conflict with the identification process already 
suggested. It is quite possible that even though Provoked subjects
were likely to identify with the victim and thus find the defendant
guilty, they might also have felt, at the same time, that the defen­
dant was "less guilty" if he had been provoked. Thus, recommendations 
for sentencing were less severe in the "Provoked" conditions than in 
the "Non-provoked"conditions.
Another concern of the current study was the effect information 
concerning the intoxication or non-intoxication of the defendant 
would have on jurors' perceptions of guilt. It had been hypothesized 
that jurors would tend to view a defendant who was drinking at the 
time of the battering incident as less responsible for his actions, and 
thus, find him guilty less often. It had also been predicted that 
jurors who found the defendant guilty would recommend more lenient 
sentences, for the same reasons as above, if the defendant was intox­
icated. However, the findings of this study did not support these pre­
dictions. Subjects who were told the defendant was intoxicated were
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no more likely to find the defendant innocent than were subjects who 
were told the defendant was not intoxicated. Severity of sentencing 
was also unaffected by such information. However, since the infor­
mation concerning the defendant’s intoxication consisted of only two 
sentences in the context of a lengthy, 5-page case summary, it is 
possible that the impact of this information was reduced somewhat in 
light of the total amount of information which subjects received. 
Clearly, more research is necessary in this area in order to assess 
the impact of this variable on jurors’ decisions. Future investiga­
tions might give the information concerning the intoxication of the 
defendant more prominence in the total summary of the case information 
as a means of more realistically doing this. Additionally, the inclu­
sion of a test of individual subjects’ recall for the important details 
of the case, such as alcohol involvement, might provide additional 
feedback concerning the impact of such information on jurors.
An additional concern of this study was the effect of victim 
provocation and defendant intoxication on jurors’ perceptions 
responsibility. In line with the hypotheses made concerning percep­
tions of guilt, it was expected that subjects who received pro­
vocation information would tend to perceive the relative responsi­
bility of the victim and defendant differently. However, this was 
not found to be the case. Essentially, subjects saw the defendant 
as being primarily responsible for the battering incident, whether 
provocation occurred or not. Similarly, it was also expected that 
jurors who were given information indicating defendant intoxication 
would perceive the defendant's responsibility for the crime somewhat
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differently. However, as before, subjects saw the defendant as 
being more responsible for the battering incident than the victim, 
regardless of his state of intoxication.
Another aim of the present investigation was to examine the 
relationship between jurors’ perception of guilt and general views 
of the role of women in society. In this context, it had been pos­
tulated that individual jurors with traditional views of women, 
when presented with evidence that the female victim may have acted 
aggressively prior to the battering incident, would be less likely 
to find the defendant guilty than jurors with non-traditional views. 
Again^ this prediction was not borne out by the findings of this 
study. However, since this prediction was based on research which 
suggested that aggressive behavior directed toward women was disap­
proved of less by traditionalistic individuals when feminine sex role 
expectations were violated, it is possible that in this particular 
case, the female victim was not seen as being overly aggressive or as 
violating social expectations. In other words, perhaps the victim 
portrayed in the "Provoked" conditions was not perceived by the jurors 
as being all that provocative or as intolerably abusive. If such 
was the case, traditional jurors’ social expectations would not have 
been violated sufficiently to produce the reactions seen by other 
researchers, such as Young, ^  al. (1975) and Kaleta and Buss (Note 3). 
Additionally, this possibility could also be seen as providing some 
support for the speculation that female jurors may have identified 
with the victim. It is unlikely that they would have, had she been 
perceived as being too "shrewish" or extremely unfeminine. Pilot-work
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geared toward assessing what Is actually considered "provocative" 
female behavior by most people should certainly be completed before 
research In a similar vein Is attempted.
It Is Interesting to note that In Condition IV, that Is, the 
condition In which case summary Information Indicated defendant 
Intoxication and made no mention of victim provocation, jurors, both 
Individually and In groups, were more likely to find the defendant 
not guilty than those jurors In Conditions I, II, and III. These 
findings were rather unexpected In terms of the original hypotheses, 
and one can only speculate as to why jurors should react differently 
In this condition. Apparently, jurors were Interpreting this Infor­
mation In a special fashion which led to fewer guilty verdicts, although 
anecdotal Information obtained from the jurors contains no clues as 
to how this was occurring. Certainly, Isolation of the factors Impor­
tant here requires further Investigation.
In view of both the sociological and experimental findings con­
cerning attitudes toward female victims of violence, the general 
results of this study. I.e., the overall percentages of guilty verdicts 
for the four conditions (see Table 2), provide substantial food for 
thought. The social psychological literature, particularly In the area 
of victim devaluation, suggests that most people have a tendency to 
blame the Innocent victim of violence for his or her misfortune. Like­
wise, the sociological literature also suggests that many Individuals 
tend to feel that battered women may "deserve" what they get. In this 
particular case, then, one malght have expected that jurors* reactions 
to the defendant would be more positive, resulting In a fairly large 
percentage of not guilty verdicts. However, Interestingly enough. In
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all four conditions of the study, at least half of the jurors found 
the defendant guilty. In three out of the four conditions, the 
average percentage of guilty verdicts was 77%. Such percentages seem 
surprisingly high, and suggest a greater sensitivity than was ex­
pected to the problem of marital violence and to the problem of 
attributing responsibility in such cases. However, since it seems 
likely that the simulated jurors in this particular study did not 
perceive the victim as being particularly provocative, it would be 
interesting to assess the effects of portraying the victim as more 
provocative and abusive. As has been mentioned, exactly what is 
considered by most people to be "provocative" female behavior needs 
to be assessed by further pilot-work.
It should also be noted that the anecdotal information provided 
by the experimental assistants present during the group deliberations 
sheds some light on the reasoning process which apparently went on in 
those groups which found the defendant not guilty. Not surprisingly, 
the fact that there were no witnesses of the battering incident 
figured prominently in some jurors’ decisions to find the defendant 
not guilty, particularly since the "Instructions To The Jurors" inclu­
ded a passage which stated that the juror must decide whether he was 
convinced of the defendant’s guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt". Many 
jurors reportedly interpreted the instruction, "beyond a reasonable 
doubt", as meaning they must have absolutely "no doubt" as to the guilt 
of the defendant, if they were to find him guilty. The intentionality 
of the defendant was another factor which was given much consideration by 
groups which found the defendant not guilty. Whether the defendant was
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intoxicated or not, jurors frequently speculated that the defendant 
probably had not "meant" to hit his wife, and therefore, was not 
guilty. One juror, for example, even supported this view by stating 
that even though he had hit his girl-friend on occasion, he had never 
done so intentionally— it had just "happened". Finally, two groups 
finding the defendant not guilty apparently did so because informa­
tion concerning the victim's and defendant's respective height and 
weight was not available to them. They felt that a sufficiently 
large woman could conceivably threaten a small man, such that he 
would be required to strike her in self-defense. Because this infor­
mation was not included in the case summary, jurors again noted they 
could not find the defendant guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt". As 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction seems to have played an 
important role in the decision-making process of the jurors of this 
study, it would seem that further investigation of the impact of this 
instruction on jury decision-making is necessary. The interpreta­
tion of the "reasonable doubt" clause by individual jurors in this 
study was apparently quite variable, and it would be interesting to 
examine exactly how jurors tend to interpret this instruction.
The present study does have some important limitations which 
should be discussed. First, the experiment was a simulation of actual 
courtroom procedures. Students were used as jurors; they read only 
a summary of a case, and knew their verdicts had no real consequences 
for the defendant. Problems in generalizing from laboratory experi­
ments to the actual courtroom situation have been discussed at length 
by Gerbasi, e_t (1977). Nevertheless, such experiments are at least
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a starting point. Second, some problems did arise when the group 
juries were asked to render an unanimous verdict. Almost half of 
these group juries were unable to do this in the time allotted; it 
is difficult to predict whether a lengthier deliberation period would 
have alleviated this problem. Experimental assistants noted that 
jurors tended to become emotionally invested in their particular posi­
tion and often clung tenaciously to their verdict even if it meant a 
"hung" jury. It seems unlikely, then, that a longer deliberation 
period would have affected those jurors whose viewpoints had "crystal­
lized" to the point where they were unable to change their verdicts. 
Although group juries clearly improve the quality of analogue jury 
research, duplicating actual courtroom procedure in terms of actual 
deliberation time is somewhat problematic for researchers in this area. 
Kerr, et al. (1975), encountering a similar problem, suggested that 
one answer may be to replace the unanimous decision rule with a major­
ity decision rule. Certainly, attempts should be made to continue 
implementing group deliberation as a part of analogue jury research.
As has been mentioned already, the present investigation's find­
ings suggest a number of possibilities for future research. Clearly, 
assessment of the impact of a victim who is portrayed as more intolerable 
and clearly violating sex role expectations might be appropriate.
Also, examination of the effect of defendant intoxication might be 
more realistically carried out by giving such defendant information 
more prominence within the total case summary information which jurors 
receive. It seems quite possible that, in this study, the sheer amount
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of information which jurors received may have diverted attention from 
the variables under study. Future investigations might attempt to ex­
amine the effects of the same variables, but in the context of less 
total information.
Finally, several other possibilities for research in areas which 
are somewhat peripheral to the research questions which were origi­
nally posed have already been noted in the course of the discussion.
It would be interesting, first of all, to examine more closely exactly 
how jurors interpret the "reasonable doubt" instruction, within the con­
text of certain types of cases. If the anecdotal information gained 
from this study is at all accurate, individual jurors vary a great deal 
in their standards of reasonable doubt. Additionally, it would be 
intersting to note whether jurors in marital assault cases tend to 
interpret the "reasonable doubt" clause in a different manner from 
jurors in non-marital assault cases. Second, as some jurors were evi­
dently disturbed by the fact that there were no witnesses to the alleged 
assault, the impact of witness testimony in marital assault cases on 
jurors’ perceptions of guilt might be assessed by further investigation. 
Again, it might be worthwhile to assess whether jurors in conjugal 
assault cases tend to feel the testimony of witnesses is more important 
than jurors in assault cases involving two unrelated parties. As it is 
often the case that there are no witnesses in marital assault cases, 
the importance of this factor seems to be an area worthy of further 
inquiry. Last, as several jurors seemed concerned about the relative 
sizes of the assaulter and his victim, and implicitly, about their 
relative ability to threaten harm to each other, the effect of such 
information on jurors’ perception of guilt might also be examined in
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future studies. Certainly, a great deal of work still needs to be 
done in order to assess the importance of the variables in question, 
victim provocation and defendant intoxication, to Jury decision­
making. Hopefully the findings of the current investigation have 
clarified, to some extent, the problems which may be encountered in 
such research, and provided some impetus for future study in the 
area.
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY
The general intent of the present investigation was to examine 
the effect a hypothetical wife-battering case would have on mock 
jurors* perceptions of a defendant's guilt. More specifically, the 
purpose of the study was to (a) assess the impact of manipulating 
two situational variables in the case, namely victim provocation and 
intoxication of the assaulter, on jurors* verdicts and sentencing 
recommendations, and (b) examine the relationship between perception 
of guilt and general views of the role of women in society, as assessed 
by a short version of the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS).
174 subjects (85 males, 89 females) who had previously completed 
the AWS were selected from University of Montana introductory and 
developmental psychology classes and randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions. All subjects received a court case summary 
involving charges stemming from an alleged incident in which a woman 
was beaten by her husband. However, half of the subjects received 
information in the summary which indicated that the victim had been 
verbally and physically abusive to her husband prior to the beating 
(Provocation), while the other subjects received information which indi­
cated that the victim did nothing to provoke the battering incident 
(No Provocation). Similarly, case summaries either indicated that the 
husband (defendant) was intoxicated at the time the battering took 
place, or that he was sober. The four experimental conditions, then,
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included: (1) Provocation-Intoxication, (2) No Provocation-Intoxi­
cation, (3) Provocation-No Intoxication, and (4) No Provocation-No 
Intoxication. After perusing the court case summary, subjects were 
first asked to render an individual verdict; if they found the defen­
dant guilty they were also asked to make sentencing recommendations. 
After rendering an individual verdict, subjects were divided into six- 
person jury groups and asked to deliberate until they were able to 
reach an unanimous group verdict. Finally, subjects were asked to 
complete a brief questionnaire concerning their perceptions of the 
victim, the defendant, and the case in general.
The results of the present study revealed that (a) when the 
female victim appeared to have elicited the battering incident by 
being both verbally and physically abusive, female subjects were sig­
nificantly more likely to find the defendant guilty than when the vic­
tim did not provoke her attacker, (b) subjects who were given informa­
tion indicating the defendant was intoxicated during the battering 
incident were no more likely to find the defendant innocent than were 
those subjects give "No Intoxication" information, and (c) subjects 
with more traditionalistic attitudes toward the role of women in society 
were no more likely to find the defendant not guilty when his wife 
provoked the incident than those subjects with more non-traditional 
attitudes toward women. Additionally, although defendant intoxication 
information had no effect on subjects' sentencing recommendation, 
subjects who received information suggesting victim provocation tended 
to recommend more lenient sentences for the defendant than those sub­
jects who did not receive such information.
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Possible interpretations of the current results and implications 
for future research were discussed. Also, pertinent anecdotal informa­
tion gained from the study was detailed. Additional comments were 
directed toward the limitations of the present investigation, and sugges­
tions were made as to how these might be alleviated in future analogue 
jury studies.
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APPENDIX A 
Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS)
The statements listed below describe attitudes toward the role of 
women in society that different people have. There are no right or 
wrong answers, only opinions. You are asked to express your feeling 
about each statement by indicating whether you (A) agree strongly,
(B) agree mildly, (C) disagree mildly, or (D) disagree strongly.
Please indicate your opinion by blackening either A, B, C, or D on 
the anxwer sheet provided.
1, Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the speech of a
woman than of a man.
2, Women should take increasing responsibility for leadership in
solving the intellectual and social problems of the day,
3, Both husband and wife should be allowed the same grounds for
divorce,
4, Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative.
5, Intoxication among women is worse than intoxication among men.
6, Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside 
the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing 
dishes and doing laundry,
7, It is insulting to women to have the "obey" clause remain in the 
marriage service,
8, There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and pro­
motion without regard to sex.
9, A woman should be as free as a man to propose marriage.
10, Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming 
good wives and mothers.
11, Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the expense 
when they go out together.
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12. Women should assume their rightful place In business and all the 
professions along with men.
13. A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to 
have quite the same freedom of action as a man.
14. Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to 
college than daughters,
15. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man 
to dam socks.
16. In general, the father should have greater authority than the 
mother in the bringing up of children.
17. Women should be encouraged not to become sexually Intimate with 
anyone before marriage, even their fiances.
18. The husband should not be favored by law over the wife in the disposal 
of family property or income.
19. Women should be concerned with their duties of childbearing and 
house tending, rather than with desires for professional and 
business careers.
20. The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the 
hands of men.
21. Economic and social freedom is worth far more to women than 
acceptance of the ideal of femininity which has been set up by men.
22. On the average, women should be regarded as less capable of contrib­
uting to economic production than are men.
23. There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over 
women in being hired or promoted.
24. Women should be given equal opportunity with men for apprenticeship 
in the various trades.
25. The modern girl is entitled to the same freedom from regulation 
and control that is given to the modern boy.
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL BOOKLET
I. General Instructions;
Please read the following description of an incident and the 
court proceedings which resulted. You are asked to render a verdict 
on the basis of the evidence presented. This description includes 
the main points from an actual trial. The information you provide 
will be used to help formulate policy for dealing with similar cases, 
so it is very important that you imagine yourself to be in a court­
room situation and assume that you are an actual member of the 
jury, PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THE PARTICULARS OF THIS CASE OR YOUR 
VERDICT WITH THE OTHER PEOPLE PRESENT UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
DO SO.
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II. The Incident;
On the evening of July 18, 1978, Mrs. Carole Jones 
(age 31) states that she was assaulted by her husband, William 
Jones (age 32), in the kitchen of their home. According to Mrs. 
Jones, her husband arrived home at approximately 10:30 PM. 
(Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones states he appeared to be very
drunk at the time.) (No Intoxication Condition: Mrs. Jones
states he did not appear to have been drinking before coming 
home.) When Mrs. Jones asked her husband where he had been 
that evening, she says he became very angry, shouted at her, 
and began kicking the kitchen furniture. (Provocation Condi­
tion; At that point, Mrs. Jones says she became very angry and 
began shouting back at him and calling him names, including 
"lousy bum" and "stupid bastard". Then, when Mr. Jones 
began kicking the furniture, Mrs. Jones states that she slapped 
him on the arm once and told him to "cut it out".) She asserts 
that then Mr. Jones struck her on the left side of the head.
When it began to "look like trouble", Mrs, Jones says she moved 
towards the phone with the intent to summon help. Mrs. Jones 
states her husband then attempted to take the phone away from 
her at that point and struck her several more times on the 
head and face with the phone receiver, until she broke away 
from him and ran to the neighbors' home next door.
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III. The Prosecution*s Case;
1) The prosecution first called Mr. Tom Steck, neighbor of
Mr. and Mrs. Jones to testify. According to Mr. Steck, on
the evening of July 18, 1978, he and his wife heard a knock 
at the front door and answered it. They found Mrs. Jones 
without her glasses and with blood on her face and clothes.
Mrs. Steck then called 911, the emergency number. Looking out 
the window, Mr. Steck saw Nr. Jones get into his car and 
leave. Mr. Steck said he then went with Mrs. Jones to her house 
and waited in the driveway for the police.
2) The prosecution then submitted the report of the investiga­
ting officer, James Hailey. According to Hailey, when he 
arrived at the scene, Mr. Jones had left and Mrs. Jones was 
in the house bleeding moderately from the nose. He stated it 
looked as though her nose could be broken. There was also
a large bruise on her left temple, and her left eye was very 
swollen. There was blood on Mrs. Jones* shirt, and on the 
floor of the kitchen. When asked, Mrs. Jones said that 
she wished to sign a complaint, and Officer Hailey took a 
written statement from her about the incident.
3) Hospital records submitted by the prosecution showed that 
upon admittance to the emergency room, Mrs. Jones stated that 
she had been beaten up by her husband. Her nose was bleeding 
and her left eye was swollen shut. Subsequent examination 
revealed a broken nose and hemorrhaging left eye.
4) In its closing argument, the prosecution stated that it had 
proven its case by presenting the charges made by Mrs. Jones, 
the testimony of her neighbor and the investigating officer, 
and by submitting hospital records which detailed the extent 
of Mrs. Jones' injuries. In addition, the prosecution noted 
that it was very unlikely their client concocted the beating 
story so quickly and in so much detail under the circumstances 
described.
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IV. The Defense's Case:
1) The defense first called Mr, Jones to testify in his own behalf. 
Mr. Jones stated that he had not been angry about being asked by 
his wife, Carole, where he had been on the evening of July 18, 
1978, and denied shouting at her and "kicking furniture around". 
Instead, he stated that his wife was extremely upset with him for 
coming home at such a late hour {Provocation Condition: and 
began being both verbally and physically abusive of him.) He 
asserted that she then grabbed the telephone receiver and came
at him, as if she was going to strike him with it.
2) According to Mr. Jones, he then struggled with his wife in an 
effort to get the phone out of her hands, so as to protect 
himself. He admitted that it was possible that his wife may have 
received blows to the head at that time, but he denied that he 
ever intentionally struck his wife or intended to harm her in
any way. (Intoxication Condition: He admitted he had been drink­
ing heavily before coming home.) (No Intoxication Condition:
He stated that he had not been drinking before coming home.)
He further stated that he had no idea she was hurt badly at the 
time, and so left the scene in order to allow his wife to "cool 
off".
3) Next, the defense called Dr. H.R. Brown, a local physician,
to the stand. According to Dr. Brown, there was nothing in the 
hospital records submitted by the prosecution which would indicate 
that Mrs. Jones' injuries were intentionally caused. He 
clarified this statement by saying that the hospital records did 
not prove, one way or the other, whether or not the injuries 
were accidentally or intentionally caused.
4) In its closing argument, the defense attested that their client 
acted in self-defense during the incident in question, and in no 
way intended to harm his wife. Any blows received by Mrs. Jones, 
the defense further stated, were entirely accidental. In addition, 
the defense felt that the hospital records submitted by the 
prosecution did not rule out the possibility that the pattern
of injuries received by Mrs. Jones could have been accidentally 
caused.
80
or another, or to prevent the commision of a forcible felony.
After weighing these points, you must decide whether the evidence 
has convinced you of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If any such doubt causes a feeling of hesitation and dis­
satisfaction in your mind which will not permit you to rest on a 
verdict of guilty by the evidence, then, by law, you are to find the 
defendant not guilty.
The law forbids you to be governed by sentiment, sympathy, 
passion, prejudice or public opinion. Both the State and the defen­
dant have the right to expect that you will faithfully and fairly 
consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and 
that you will reach a just verdict, without considering what the 
consequences or sentence will be.
GIVEN:
E, P. Haskell 
District Court Judge
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VI. Individual Verdict Questionnaire;
1) Now we would like you to Indicate your verdict. Please 
feel free to review all Instructions and Information.
As a juror, I find the defendant: (circle one)
a) guilty
b) not guilty
2) If you voted "guilty" above, what would your recommended 
sentence (actual time In jail) be?
a) Maximum sentence of 5 years
b) Maximum sentence of 2-3 years
c) Maximum sentence of 1 year
d) Maximum sentence of 8 months
e) Maximum sentence of 6 months
f) Maximum sentence of 2 months
g) Maximum sentence of 30 days or less
3) How confident are you of your verdict? (circle one)
a) Extremely confident of verdict
b) Strongly confident of verdict
c) Moderately confident
d) Slightly confident
e) Unsure of verdict
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APPENDIX C 
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1) How important do you feel the testimony of the investigating officer 
in this case (Officer Hailey) was in helping you to render your final 
verdict? (circle one)
a) extremely important
b) very important
c) moderately important
d) slightly important
e) not important at all
2) Please rate the defendant, Mr, Jones, in terms of how much responsi­
bility you feel he bears for the incident in question:
a) completely responsible
b) very responsible
c) moderately responsible
d) slightly responsible
e) not at all responsible
3) Now, please rate Mrs. Jones in terms of how much responsibility you 
feel she bears for the incident in question:
a) completely responsible
b) very responsible
c) moderately responsible
d) slightly responsible
e) not at all responsible
4) How important do you feel the testimony of the physician. Dr. Brown, 
was in helping you to render your final verdict?
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a) extremely important
b) very Important
c) moderately important
d) slightly important
e) not important at all
5) How confident would you be of your final verdict, if you were told 
that the couple involved in this case, Mr. and Mrs, Jones, recon­
ciled and began living together again after the trial?
a) extremely confident of verdict
b) very confident of verdict
c) moderately confident
d) slightly confident
e) unsure of verdict
6) How important do you feel the testimony of the Jones' neighbor,
Mr. Steck, was in helping you to render your final verdict?
a) extremely important
b) very important
c) moderately important
d) slightly important
e) not important at all
7) Whose testimony was most important in helping you to render your 
final verdict? (circle one)
a) Mrs, Jones'
b) Mr, Jones'
c) Mr, Steck's
d) Officer Hailey's
e) Dr. Brown's
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time in jail) be?
a) Maximum sentence of 5 years
b) Maximum sentence of 2-3 years
c) Maximum sentence of 1 year
d) Maximum sentence of 8 months
e) Maximum sentence of 6 months
f) Maximum sentence of 2 months
g) Maximum sentence of 30 days or less
